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Perception of Bribery, an Anti-Corruption Campaign, and Health 




Although various theoretical predictions have been made, empirical evidence on the 
impact of bribery remains limited, especially in the health sector. This study explores how 
the perception of bribery is associated with health service utilization in Vietnam by using 
provincial panel data during 2012–2018. We found that a higher perception of bribery is 
associated with fewer inpatient days, suggesting that bribery potentially influences the 
deterioration of welfare services. However, no such effect on the number of consultations 
at health facilities and the number of inpatients was detected. In addition, we found that 
a strong general anti-corruption campaign would offset the negative effects of bribery on 
the number of inpatient days.  
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 In the context of public health care, bribery can be defined as informal payments 
in the form of cash or in-kind transfers to service providers in addition to official 
payments (Lewis, 2007). Indeed, bribery accounts for a large proportion of the health care 
expenses for patients in developing and emerging countries (Balabanova and McKee, 
2002; Belli et al., 2004; Falkingham, 2004; Killingsworth et al., 1999; Szende and Culyer, 
2006). Theoretically, bribery may enhance efficiency. For example, Méon and Weill 
(2010) highlighted the potential of bribery to ‘‘grease the wheels’’ of an economy by 
compensating for weak institutions, an idea that is consistent with studies of public choice 
theory. Meanwhile, theories of negative consequences are discussed in the corruption 
literature. For instance, Guriev (2004) demonstrates that the base quality of health care 
services might be intentionally reduced by service providers with the aim of eliciting more 
payments. However, despite the various theoretical predictions, empirical evidence on the 
impact of bribery remains limited, especially in the health sector.  
 The first contribution of this study to the literature is to fill in this research gap 
by using provincial panel data from Vietnam. Specifically, we examine health outcomes 
and direct perceptions of bribery in the health care sector. The most closely related study, 
Mavisakalyan et al. (2021), used a self-assessed health index, which limits the quality of 
the health outcomes. In contrast, we use the following three utilization-based objective 
health outcomes: (1) the number of consultations at health facilities, (2) the number of 
inpatients, and (3) the number of inpatient days. Further, Mavisakalyan et al. (2021) asked 
about experiences paying bribes in the past 12 months. Meanwhile, our bribery proxy is 
from a separate perception-based survey that is not affected by the issue of sample 
selection. 
 The second contribution to the literature is to investigate the influence of a 
general anti-corruption campaign on the health sector. Since 2016, the Vietnamese 
government has been conducting a substantive anti-corruption campaign to tackle 
corruption. Even top-ranked officials, including the Deputy Prime Minister, members of 
the Politburo, and members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV-CC, hereafter), who had previously been immune from investigation and were 
essentially untouchable, have been targeted in the campaign. Investigations were 
launched in 2016 and criminal corruption charges were filed in 2017 and 2018. In 
Vietnam, the CPV-CC, particularly the Politburo members, has absolute power to decide 
who leads what agencies and organizations, from the grassroots to the highest levels of 
government. Therefore, the impact of arrests could be tremendous, especially in provinces 
where politicians hold absolute power or in their home province. Vietnamese politicians 
 4 
have been reported to show home-biased regional favoritism (Do et al. 2017, Vu and 
Yamada 2017). Therefore, in this study, we examine the impact of the general anti-
corruption campaign on the health sector by using information on top-ranked politicians 
who were arrested and convicted crimes as a result of this campaign. 
 
2. Data 
 We used various sources of information in order to construct a panel data set on 
Vietnamese provinces from 2012 to 2018. We obtained province-level health outcomes 
from the Health Statistics Yearbooks published by the Ministry of Health of Vietnam. The 
three outcome variables are as follows: (1) the number of consultations at health facilities 
of all kinds, (2) the number of inpatients, and (3) the number of inpatient days per year in 
each province. The population size of each province was also obtained from the Health 
Statistics Yearbooks. Our analysis does not include Hanoi because the Ministry of Health 
noted that the corresponding statistical figures were not updated annually. 
 Data on province-level bribery was obtained from the Viet Nam Governance and 
Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) 2012–2018. Conducted annually, PAPI 
is a unique household survey that captures public perception of and people’s experience 
with bribery in the public sector, including government agencies, schools, and hospitals 
at all levels. PAPI uses multistage and random sampling methods in order to ensure 
national representativeness. Since it began surveying all provinces in 2011, PAPI has 
collected the views of about 13,000–14,000 Vietnamese every year.1 Responses to the 
survey item asking whether participants agreed with the statement “People like me have 
to pay a bribe to receive medical treatment in the district’s hospitals” were used to 
measure the perception of bribery in the health sector of a given province. Specifically, 
we aggregated the responses in order to derive the percentage of respondents who gave 
an affirmative answer to the question in the province as the perception of bribery. When 
the percentage was high, we regarded the province as being a highly corrupt (bribe-
prevalent) area. This is a common approach to asking such a sensitive question without 
identifying ‘who’ has paid bribes (Matsushima and Yamada, 2016). 
The province-level health insurance coverage rate was computed using Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) data from 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. 
Because the VHLSS is conducted biannually, the coverage rate for other years was 
estimated by interpolation. The health insurance coverage rate is an important control 
because 2012–2018 corresponded to the period in which the government worked very 
 
1 The latest PAPI report is available at https://papi.org.vn/eng/bao-cao/ (accessed on June 29, 2021). 
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actively to expand universal health insurance coverage (Matsushima et al., 2020).  
 To construct a proxy for the potential influence of the general anti-corruption 
campaign in 2016, we relied on the information in several popular news articles.2 The 
initiator of the campaign was Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam (the most powerful position in Vietnam). The campaign, which was 
nicknamed “burning the oven” (after Nguyen Phu Trong’s famous statement “once the 
[anti-corruption] oven is burned, even fresh wood [of corruption] will catch fire”), 
targeted all types of corruption and was not limited by geographical borders. Five 
provinces, namely Da Nang, Phu Tho, Thai Binh, Ha Giang, and Ho Chi Minh, were 
either the home provinces or former working provinces of indicted members of the CPV-
CC.3 That is, they must have held the top position, first ranked, in their former working 
province during 2011–2016. We created a dummy variable for these five provinces in 
2017 and 2018 in order to investigate the potential influence of the general anti-corruption 
campaign. 




3. Empirical model and estimation results 
 We employed a panel fixed-effects model at the province level in order to 




2 The following two sources are particularly informative: https://vnexpress.net/nhung-uy-vien-trung-
uong-khoa-xii-bi-ky-luat-dang-4201394.html and https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/resources/idt-
1a9d5151-f77e-45c4-9dfe-c19c663be8df (both accessed on June 29, 2021). 
3 Hanoi was on the list, but we excluded it from our analysis due to data limitations. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
The number of consultations at health
facilities (thousand) 431 3055.98 4110.46 426.82 37944.16
The number of inpatients (thousand) 429 207.89 200.24 37.29 1713.62
The number of inpatient days (thousand) 420 1284.66 1271.76 180.32 10454.17
Perception of bribery (%) 432 39.45 12.42 10.82 69.50
Dummy for 5 provinces associated with
punished top-ranked politicians in 2017
and 2018
432 0.02 0.15 0 1
ln(Population/1000) 432 7.06 0.53 5.71 9.06
Health insurance coverage rate (%) 432 75.76 12.75 39.21 98.14
Authors' calculations
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𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦 + 𝛾𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑥 𝛿 + 𝜃 + 𝜇 + 𝜀 .    (1) 
 
Here, 𝑦  is one of the following three utilization-based health outcomes in province 𝑖 
in year 𝑡: the number of consultations at health facilities, the number of inpatients, and 
the number of inpatient days. 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦  is the perception of bribery in province 𝑖 in 
year 𝑡, which is our main variable of interest. 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  takes 1 for the five 
provinces (associated with the arrested members of the CPV-CC) named in the previous 
section in 2017 and 2018, and 0 otherwise. 𝑥  is a vector of other control variables 
(health insurance coverage rate and log of population [thousand]). 𝜃  and 𝜇  are the 
year and province fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the province 
level. Our parameter of interest is 𝛽, whereas 𝛾 is used for further analysis in order to 
investigate the possible spillover effect of the anti-corruption campaign on health service 
utilization. 
 Table 2 shows the estimation results. Columns 1, 3, and 5 do not include 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 , whereas columns 2, 4, and 6 do. Comparing columns 1 and 2, 3 and 
4, and 5 and 6, the coefficient of 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦  is very stable regardless of whether 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  is included. For the number of consultations at health facilities, the 
point estimate is positive but statistically insignificant. For the number of inpatients, 
although the point estimate of 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦  is negative, it is still statistically insignificant. 
For the number of inpatient days, the point estimate of 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦  is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. This implies that a higher perception of bribery 
is associated with fewer inpatient days. This could be interpreted as evidence of a negative 
influence of bribery because patients might stay at a hospital longer only if they have paid 
a corresponding bribe. Hence, a lower level of bribery would improve welfare for 
inpatients.  
 Next, we turn to 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 . The coefficients of 𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
are positive and statistically significant for the number of inpatients (column 4) and the 
number of inpatient days (column 6). Hence, the anti-corruption campaign was effective 
at increasing inpatient-related utilization. In particular, we tested whether the anti-
corruption campaign’s impact was significantly relevant enough to eliminate the negative 
impact of bribery on the number of inpatient days. Hence, our null hypothesis is a joint 
one for each of the five provinces (𝑖) in 2017 and 2018 (𝑡 = 2017 𝑜𝑟 2018). 
 𝛽𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦 + 𝛾 = 0    (2) 
 
Here, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are the estimated parameters in Equation 1. Table 3 show the results of 
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the joint tests. The perception of bribery in terms of percentage for each of the five 
provinces in 2017 and 2018 is shown in columns 1 and 2, whereas the corresponding F-
statistics for Equation 2 are shown in columns 3 and 4. The null hypotheses can be 
rejected because the F-statistics are very small (less than 1). These test results suggest 
that the anti-corruption campaign’s impact was indeed significant enough to wipe out the 






 This study showed that bribery might have a negative influence on the number 
of inpatient days, leading to deterioration of welfare among inpatients. However, the 
results also showed that the strong general anti-corruption campaign improved welfare 
Table2: Main estimation results using fixed-effect models
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bribery 0.8722 0.8754 -0.2302 -0.2451 -5.6632* -5.7138*
(5.3103) (5.3080) (0.5147) (0.4986) (3.3287) (3.3272)
AntiCorruption -12.2621 56.1829** 188.4093*
(259.8666) (24.1962) (95.7073)
-4.7368 -4.7775 -0.3158 -0.1321 -4.5295 -3.8999
(7.9621) (8.2340) (0.6835) (0.6705) (5.2040) (4.9825)
Population (log) -14.0298 -13.8004 10.2471 9.1933 -54.0324 -57.6530
(87.0254) (85.3193) (12.9159) (12.1709) (40.3409) (39.9776)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 431 431 429 429 420 420
R-squared 0.032 0.032 0.203 0.221 0.063 0.068
Number of provinces 62 62 62 62 62 62
Standard errors clustered at province-level are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Healthinsurance
coverage rate
Number of number of consultations
at health facilities Number of inpatients Number of inpatient days
2017 2018 2017 2018
Da Nang 27.78 32.39 0.09 0.00
Phu Tho 34.08 25.14 0.00 0.21
Thai Binh 55.91 48.17 0.59 0.34
Ha Giang 42.94 38.30 0.18 0.06
Ho Chi Minh 30.83 30.00 0.01 0.03
Source: authors' calculations




Table 3: Joint hypothesis test of bribery and the anti-corruption campaign for
the number of inpatient days
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and offset the negative effects of bribery. Therefore, the policy implication is that a strong 
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